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Abstract 
 
We address the question of endogenous financing of the Universal Service Obligations and we 
compare it with the exogenous financing. A fund is created and fed through a tax firms pay. We 
show that the way these funds are implemented by the current regulatory regimes at work goes 
against the social welfare. We propose a new way of implementing the fund that improves 
welfare. Moreover, we challenge the proportionality payment principle as it leads to lower 
welfare. 
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1 Introduction
The last two decades witnessed the large scale deregulation of sectors such as
telecommunications, transportation, electricity or gas. Due to technological
advances, such network industries have ceased to be natural monopolies and
competing operators are starting to enter the markets. This is likely to affect
considerably the way the industries operate.
In the markets of public utilities the regulator often values an ‘equal
access’ of all consumers to the service at an ‘affordable tariff’.1 Whereas
networks were previously operated by monopolies who were in charge of
these universal service obligations, the arrival of new entrants in markets
that are now open to competition induces cream skimming on profitable
segments of the market and makes previous monopolies unable to finance
these obligations through cross-subsidies (see Laffont and Tirole, 2000). The
firm is no longer willing to serve high-cost areas at low prices or to subsidize
low-income consumers. The industry develops therefore a conflict of interests
between operators’ objective of maximizing profits and the objectives related
to the public policy. This conflict requires the intervention of a regulator.
Moreover, the liberalization movement leads to outcomes that might not be
desirable from the social point of view. Without regulatory constraints some
users could be excluded from the market or users with different consumption
or characteristics would face different tariffs. If the regulator values equality
with respect to the access of all user to the market, he must then impose
‘universal service obligations’ (USOs).
In the telecommunications industry universal service obligations, USOs
thereafter, have been a central issue in the political debate surrounding regu-
latory reform in most countries. Any member of the World Trade Organiza-
tion agreement on basic telecommunications has the right to define the kind
of universal service obligations it wishes to maintain.2 Therefore, the defini-
tion of the USOs varies among countries. Nevertheless, different definitions
keep common characteristics that allow a general concept of USOs. Ensur-
ing universal service means to provide a defined minimum set of services of
1See, for example, Federal Communications Commission, 1996
2For instance, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union in the
Directive 2002/22/EC stipulates the obligation of the member states that the USOs ‘are
made available with the quality specified to all end-users in their territory, irrespective of
their geographical location, and, in the light of specific national conditions, at an affordable
price’.
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specified quality to all end-users at an affordable price.
The Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament considers the fol-
lowing set of services.
• Provision of access at a fixed location, such that any end-user can be
connected to the public fixed telephone network. The connection pro-
vided shall allow end-users to make and receive local, national and
international telephone calls, facsimile communications and data com-
munications, at data rates that are sufficient to permit functional In-
ternet access.
• Directory enquiry services and directories. At least one comprehensive
directory is available to end-users in a form approved by the relevant
authority, whether printed or electronic, or both, and is updated on a
regular basis, and at least once a year. At least one comprehensive tele-
phone directory enquiry service is available to all end-users, including
users of public pay telephones.
• Public pay telephones. National regulatory authorities can impose obli-
gations on undertakings in order to ensure that public pay telephones
are provided to meet the reasonable need of end-users in terms of the
geographical coverage, the number of telephones, and the quality of
services
• Special measures for disabled users should be taken in order to en-
sure access to and affordability of publicly available telephone services,
equivalent to that enjoyed by other end-users.
There are many reasons commonly cited for making affordable telephone
service available to everyone. A customer who hooks up to a telephone
network provide a service not only for his household, but also for everyone else
on the telephone network who may ever want to contact him. This network
externality justifies some public subsidies to promote more extensive use
of telephone services. Hooking people to the telephone network may be the
cheapest way for the public sector to fulfil obligations such as providing public
health, safety and emergency services.
Redistribution toward low-income consumers or toward the high cost
users is another motivation for universal telephone service. USOs can be
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considered a redistributive policy through prices, instead of using mechanisms
such as taxation of the income or direct transfers.
Regional planning attempts to encourage a more harmonious distribu-
tion away from large congested metropolitan areas. This motivation is based
on the existence of externalities: noninternalized congestion externalities in
the large cities.
There can also be important political and social reasons of USOs.3
A democratic society has an interest in keeping its citizens informed about
developments throughout the world.
USOs in a competitive market raise two series of questions. First, who
should undertake them (the allocation problem) and second who should pay
for USOs (the funding problem). Compared to unconstrained competition
between network providers, universal service obligations induce distortions
on the competitive entry process and on the equilibrium market structure.
These distortions generate both social benefits and social costs. The question
of how to share these costs and benefits becomes one of the main concerns
for regulators, that try to determine optimal rules for allocating and funding
USOs.
On the funding side two methods exist. Most systems share the property
that they have to be self funded, that is, mechanisms where the losses are
funded through cross-subsidies and through taxes levied on consumers or
firms. Taxes may be assessed through different channels: unitary taxes may
be levied on consumers or on firms, or taxes may be levied on profits. An
alternative method consists in financing USOs through transfers from the
government.
The allocation problem refers to the question of which operator will be
assigned USOs. In most countries, after opening up the competition, only
the incumbent is assigned USOs. Nevertheless, in some cases productive
efficiency would require that competitors incur some of USOs. For instance
USOs could be auctioned (see Milgrom, 1996).
This paper belongs to a small but growing literature on USOs under com-
petition. Normative foundations to the existence of USOs were investigated
in a monopoly context by Riordan (2001) and Laffont and Tirole (2000).
3A case in point was an attempt by the staff of Federal Communications Commission to
design policies to help the homeless and the seasonal workers, who certainly count among
the least prosperous Americans. Relatively low subsidies could have helped them to have
access to voice mail services, thus enabling them to keep contact with others (family,
potential employers). Congress never considered this proposal.
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Armstrong and Vickers (1993) introduce competition and examine the ef-
fects of price discrimination when an incumbent firm faces a price taking
entrant in a profitable market while the incumbent also serves customers in
a separate market. A ban on price discrimination across the incumbent’s
markets, which is often part of an universal service requirement, causes the
incumbent to be less aggressive in response to entry.
Sorana (2000) analyzes an auction mechanism for the allocation of sub-
sidies for providing the universal service. He highlights both opportunities
and dangers that auctions offer to the regulator. He shows that auctions
may lead to higher social welfare levels than uniform subsidy schemes, but
also shows that auctions designs aimed at stimulating competition may be
particularly vulnerable to collusion among bidders.
Chone, Flochel and Perrot (2002) examine, in a market open to competi-
tion, various mechanisms for allocating USOs among agents. The obligations
they consider are geographic ubiquity and non-discrimination. They analyze
from the efficiency and equity points of view, the advantages of a ‘restricted-
entry’ system, where the entrant is not allowed to serve high cost consumers
with respect to a ‘pay-or-play’ system, where the incumbent can choose to
serve high cost consumers and not to pay the tax. Under the ubiquity con-
straint only, ‘pay-or-play’ regulation dominates restricted entry regulation
(leads to higher welfare, is preferred by the consumers and for a given tax
level or lump sum transfers, allows the regulator to decentralize the maxi-
mization of welfare to the incumbent). Nevertheless, this result no longer
holds when the regulator imposes also the non-discrimination constraint.
Valetti, Hoerning and Barros (2002) and Anton, Vander Wide and Vettas
(2002) show that under uniform prices there are strategic links between the
markets. These former discuss auctions for universal service subsidies, as
well as the impact of cross-market price constraints and introduce strategic
interaction between competitors. They analyse exogenous financing of the
USOs using a lump sum tax, in a multi-market model with an oligopolistic
(profitable) urban market and entry auctions for (unprofitable) rural service.
Cross-market price restrictions makes the firm operating in both markets to
become a ‘softer’ competitor, thus placing the firm at a strategic disadvan-
tage. Entry incentives must account for this disadvantage and strategic bid-
ding results in an equilibrium subsidy that contains a compensating premium.
Consequently, the downstream strategic disadvantage becomes advantageous
for insiders, leading to higher prices and profits.
None of these papers consider how the government finances the subsidy.
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For instance, Anton, Vander Wide and Vettas use a lump-sum tax determined
exogenously, which is just a transfer from the government. This subsidy can
be financed by some tax on the firms operating in the industry, essentially
creating a cross-subsidy from the profitable to the unprofitable segment of
the market. In principle, if welfare maximization is the goal, the government
should choose the tax level that minimizes the resulting distortions.
Our paper keeps as a benchmark the model developed by Anton, Vander
Wide and Vettas (2002). In particular, we extend their model considering
endogenous financing methods. The main contribution of this paper consists
in determining the optimal tax. This tax must produce sufficient revenue to
cover the subsidy, in other words revenue should be equal to the winning bid
in the unprofitable market auction. Taxes may be assessed through different
channels: unitary taxes may be levied on consumers or on firms, or taxes
may be levied on profits. A further contribution of this paper is to provide
a detailed evaluation of different ways to finance the subsidy. We analyse,
among the possible endogenous tax rates, which one implies less distortion
and which one allows maximization of welfare.
We examine the use of an auction to determine which firm will supply the
unprofitable rural market. Oligopoly competition takes place in a profitable
urban market and the resulting urban market price determines the ceiling
for the rural market price.
The rural market is inherently unprofitable due to large fixed costs. Thus,
no firm would independently seek to enter this market. Supply in this market
is determined by the outcome of bidding in an upstream procurement auction,
in which one firm becomes the single supplier to the rural market. Bids take
the form of subsidy requirements and the selected firm is the lowest bidder
(smallest subsidy).
The winner of the auction has the obligation to provide service at the
same price prevailing in the urban market where, after the auction, the firms
will compete a´ la Cournot. This specification captures in a static framework
the regulators’ dynamic adjustments of the ‘affordable price’ to the prices
charged in low-cost areas and the corresponding reactions of those firms who
may be active in both areas.
In short, we compare a subsidy paid by the firms with a subsidy paid
by the government in order to determine, which one is preferred from the
regulator’s point of view. We describe, among the endogenous financing
methods with a subsidy paid by the firms, which one should be chosen by
the regulator.
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We examine the impact of an endogenous subsidy under cross-market
price constraints of the universal service on prices, quantities and profits in
each of the rural and urban markets. We employ these market outcomes to
analyze welfare and the bidding incentives for the rural market auction. We
attempt to answer the question: which regulatory regime should be at work?
Which taxable basis produces the minimum distortion? We show that the
optimum regulatory regime is one where the intervention of the regulator is
stronger than under the current regulatory regime.
We analyze two different regulatory regimes, the regulatory regime at
work in Europe and an alternative where the intervention of the regulator is
stronger. We show that the regime we propose gives higher social welfare.
Given the importance of this new regulatory pattern, in the appendix we
provide a generalization in the sense of different taxable basis.
The main policy implications of our paper are that the regulatory regime
at work should allow the regulator to figure out the tax. In this context, the
proportionality principle is not desirable, as it leads to lower welfare.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the model and
section 3 the benchmark. In section 4 we describe the current regulatory
frameworks, in section 5, we present two possible choices of the regulation
pattern, that are analyzed in detail in sections 6 and 7. Finally we present
the conclusions. The appendix contains a generalization of all the taxable
basis under the new regulatory regime proposed.
2 The Model
Our paper is based on the model developed by Anton, Vander Wide and Vet-
tas (2002). We extend their model considering endogenous financing meth-
ods.
Consider two markets, U (urban) and R (rural), linked through the con-
straint pR ≤ pU and two firms, A and B operating in the urban market.
Demand functions are the followings: DU(p) = a − p in the U market, and
DR(p) = b(a − p), where p is the market price and b > 0 is the size of the
unprofitable market.
The marginal cost is c ≥ 0 and is the same for both firms and both
markets. Moreover, c < a, so that, ignoring fixed costs, it is always profitable
to supply some amount to each market. The fixed costs are FU ≥ 0, in market
U and FR > 0 in market R. As in Anton et al. we assume FR sufficiently
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large such that the profits of a monopolist that would operate only in the R
market would be negative. This assumption implies the need for subsidies if
the government wants consumers in the rural market to be served.
An auction will determine the supplier for the rural market.4
3 Benchmark
In this paper we define precisely the benchmark situation, where they con-
sider a direct subsidy, which is just a lump-sum transfer from the government
to the firm that wins the auction, and then we carefully determine the eco-
nomic distortions due the tax. We keep as a benchmark the results obtained
by Anton, Vander Wide and Vettas (2002).
We consider a complete information game with the following timing.
1. Firms choose their bids. These bids represent lump-sum subsidies that
the firm ask from the government in order to serve market R. The lowest
bidder (smallest subsidy required) wins, receives a subsidy equal to the
winning bid, incurs the fixed costs FR and becomes a monopolist in
the R market.
2. Firms A and B choose quantities qA and qB for the U market. Then
the price in the U market is determined as pU = a− qA − qB.
3. The monopolist in the R market can choose a price that can not exceed
the price determined in the U market, that is pR ≤ pU .
4. Each firm’s payoff is the sum of its profits in the two markets, including
any subsidies and taxes.
We will call the firm that gains the auction firm 1 and the one that
loses the auction firm 2 and we will solve the game backwards. Denote by
q1 the quantity supplied in the U market by the firm that operates in both
markets and by q2 the quantity supplied in the U market by the firm that
only operates in the U market. The maximization problem of firm 1 is
4Our model does not consider intangible benefits resulting from providing universal
service. We could add such benefits and make them endogenous by introducing network
externalities. Introducing such effect would make the model less general and much more
difficult to handle, so we restrict our attention to the regulatory regimes and to the best
way of financing USOs .
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max
q1
pi1 − FU − FR + S
where the operating profit for the firm that operates in both markets,
firm 1, is pi1 = [(a− q1 − q2) q1 − cq1]+[(a− q1 − q2) b (q1 + q2)− cb (q1 + q2)]
or, equivalently, pi1 = (a− c− q1 − q2) [q1 + b (q1 + q2)]. The maximization
problem of firm 2 is
max
q2
pi2 − FR
and the operating profit of the firm that operates only in the U market,
firm 2, is pi2 = [(a− c− q1 − q2) q2] .
Taking into account the price constraint pU = pR = a − q1 − q2 and
maximizing the profits of the two firms, we find the equilibrium quantities
and price:
q1 =
a− c
3 + 2b
q2 =
(a− c) (1 + b)
3 + 2b
p =
(1 + b)(1− c)
(3 + 2b)
Therefore, the equilibrium operating profit of the winner firm is:
pi1 =
(a− c)2 (1 + b)3
(3 + 2b)2
and for the loser firm is
pi2 =
(a− c)2 (1 + b)2
(3 + 2b)2
The equilibrium exogenous subsidy is that one that compensates the win-
ner firm for the disadvantage of winning the auction, therefore it is that one
that makes one firm indifferent between winning the auction or not.
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Sexo = pi2 − pi1 + FR
In the sequel we will refer to this subsidy as the exogenous subsidy, or the
direct subsidy, as it is just a transfer from the government to the firm that
wins the upstream auction. Notice that we call this subsidy exogenous from
the point of view of the method the universal service is financed, because it
is paid by the government, not because it is determined exogenously.
4 Current regulation
American and European legislation contemplate the possibility to establish
a fund to subsidize service to consumers in high cost (rural) areas. Never-
theless, no consensus has yet been reached on the contributions to the fund
and different countries follow different rules.5 In some countries (Germany,
Austria) the contributions to the fund are a function of the market share of
the operators, in others (France) the contributions are proportional to the
operators traffic. As an alternative to the fund, Ireland proposes an increase
in the interconnection fee of the operators in order to cover the financing
of USOs. In Spain the contributions to the fund depend on the gross rev-
enue of the operators. UK and Portugal did not create any fund but they
contemplate this possibility.6
The Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
stipulates:
‘Compensating undertakings designed to provide such services (universal
service) in such circumstances need not result in any distortion in competi-
tion, provided that designed undertakings are compensated for the specific net
5Telecommunications Act of 1996 and Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council
6Creating a fund may not always be the best solution, as argued in Gasmi, Laffont and
Sharkey (2000): ‘In some countries, and this is particularly so in less developed countries,
the tax system is very inefficient, sometimes even corrupt, to the point where such transfers
are socially very costly. This raises the question of what is the best way to introduce
competition to limit the deadweight losses due to this transfers. (...) More recently in
Argentina the country has been divided into two regions, each one with an urban area
and a rural area. Cross-subsidizes are maintained within each region, but some forms of
yardstick competition exists between regions.’
10
cost involved and provided that the net cost burden is recovered in a compet-
itively neutral way’.
The European Parliament defines the minimum distortions as follows:
‘The net cost of the universal service obligations may be shared between all
or certain specified classes of undertaking. Member States should ensure that
the sharing mechanism respects the principle of transparency, least market
distortion, non-discrimination and proportionality. Least market distortions
means that contributions should be recovered in a way that, as far as possible
minimises the impact of the financial burden falling on end-users, for example
by spreading contributions as widely as possible’.
Another aspect of the current European legislation that we will take into
consideration is the principle of proportionality.
The Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
states:
‘In the case of cost recoveries by means of levies on undertakings, Member
States should ensure that the methods of allocation amongst them is based on
objective and non-discriminatory criteria and it is in accordance with the
principle of proportionality. This principle does not prevent Member States
from exempting new entrants which have not yet achieved any significant
market presence.’
5 Possible choices of the regulation regime
We will study endogenous methods of financing the universal service and we
will treat the tax rate as endogenous, because the tax must produce sufficient
revenue to cover the subsidy, that is revenue should equal the winning bid
in the unprofitable market auction. We analyze two possible choices of the
regulation pattern.
The first one is the regulation regime at work in most European countries.
Under this regime the regulator chooses the taxable basis at the beginning
of the game. The firms choose the subsidy in the first stage of the game and
the tax the firms should pay is determined endogenously at the end of the
game, once the optimum quantities of the firms are settled. The tax rate
is adjusted as a consequence of the resolution of the optimization problems
of the two firms, so the regulator does not intervene to fix the tax rate.
Therefore we will refer to this regime as ‘non-intervention regime’. With
this kind of regulation firms have more degrees of freedom when they take
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their optimal choices, therefore, the market price is going to be higher than
in the case of a direct subsidy paid by the government. This is because
firms use the tax as a collusion tool that allows them to increase the final
market price. The second regulatory regime is an alternative we propose to
the current regulation. Under this regime the government determines the
taxable basis at the beginning of the game. The difference with the first
regulation pattern is that the intervention of the regulator is stronger, and
he acts as a third player of the game. The tax rate that firms should pay is
determined by the regulator simultaneously with the equilibrium quantities
of the two firms. This regime is more restrictive to the firms, as the tax
rate is determined by the regulator at the same time as the firms solve their
optimization problems, firms cannot use it anymore as a collusion tool. We
will refer to this regime as ‘regulated regime’. The regulator is searching
for the highest aggregate social welfare, that is the sum of consumer’s net
surplus and firms net profits. If welfare maximization is the goal, even if the
intervention of the regulator is minimized with the current regulatory regime,
we will show that the regulatory regime we propose is preferred because it
leads to a higher level of social welfare.
We consider three examples of taxes levied and we analyze all three types
of taxes under both regimes. The election of these taxes is justified by real
situations and by requirements that have been enacted in a number of coun-
tries.
6 Non-intervention regime
We use here a method of endogenous financing of the universal service.
Therefore tax rate must produce sufficient revenue to cover the subsidy, that
is revenue should equal the winning bid in the unprofitable market auction.
Compared to the case of a subsidy paid by the government (a direct
subsidy), a subsidy paid by the firms may induce distortions on the strategic
decisions of the firms and also on their competitive behavior, being more or
less aggressive in their bids for the rural market. These distortions generate
both social benefits and social costs. The question of how to share these
costs and benefits becomes one of the main questions for regulators and has
received various answers in different countries.
Under the ‘non-intervention regime’ the tax the firms should pay is de-
termined endogenously at the end of the game, once the firms solved their
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maximization problems. This is the regime at work in most European coun-
tries.
The game is similar to the one played without taxes. A first and a last
step are added. The game starts with a stage in which the regulator chooses
the type of endogenous financing, the taxable basis. Then the firm that is
going to serve the rural market is determined by an entry auction and the
firms compete a´ la Cournot, exactly like in the game described above. In the
last stage of the game, budget balances and the tax rate t is determined.
We solve for a subgame perfect equilibrium of this game, focusing on pure
strategy equilibria in the bidding stage. We solve the game by backward
induction.
As the tax rate t is determined at the end of the game, after the firms solve
their maximization problems, they have the freedom to behave strategically
using the tax in their favor and rise prices.
6.1 Profit tax
To illustrate the dynamic of the endogenous financing, suppose that the regu-
lator introduces a tax rate t on the profit of the firms. This is an example of a
concave taxable basis in the decision variable of each firm, or in other words,
is an example of taxable basis that is a function of the price p, or equivalently
the functional form of the taxable basis is of the type g(p)h(q1, q2), where
g and h are increasing functions. The current legislation of some countries
stipulates this type of tax (In Spain and Italy, for example, the contribution
to the fund is a function of the revenue of the operators, which is a concave
function on the decision variable of each firm, therefore it belongs to the
same class of taxable basis as the profit tax).
When the subsidy is financed through a tax on the firms that are present
in the market, a cross-subsidy from the profitable to the unprofitable zone
is created. The decision variable of each firm is its quantity, but the results
still hold qualitatively if firms’ decision variable is the price.
The complete information game is similar to the game played in a frame-
work without taxes, the difference is that now, given S (the subsidy), in the
fourth stage of the game Cournot competition takes place under restrictions.
The operators will maximize their respective objective functions subject to
the common restriction S = t (pi1 + pi2), as the sum of the taxes levied from
the firms present in the market must cover the subsidy required by the winner
firm. The maximization problem of firm 1 is:
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max
q1
pi1 − FU − FR + S − tpi1
s.t. S = t (pi1 + pi2)
The maximization problem of firm 2 is:7
max
q2
pi2 − FR − S − tpi2
s.t. S = t (pi1 + pi2)
Substituting the restriction in the objective function, firm 1’s maximiza-
tion problem can be written
max
q1
pi1 − FU − FR + pi2
pi1 + pi2
S
which is equivalent to
max
q1
pi1 − FU − FR + q2
(1 + b) (q1 + q2)
S
Similarly, firm 2’s problem is
max
q2
pi2 − FU − pi2
pi1 + pi2
S
which can be written as
max
q2
pi2 − FU − q2
(1 + b) (q1 + q2)
S
Solving these problems we obtain:
q1 =
(a− c)
2 (3 + 2b)
+
√
(1 + b) (2 + b)2
(
(1 + b) (2 + b)2 (a− c)2 − 4 (3 + 2b)S
)
2 (1 + b) (2 + b)2 (3 + 2b)
q2 =
(1 + b) (a− c)
2 (3 + 2b)
+
√
(1 + b) (2 + b)2
(
(1 + b) (2 + b)2 (a− c)2 − 4 (3 + 2b)S
)
2 (2 + b)2 (3 + 2b)
7Notice that making the loser firm to pay for the subsidy could push the firm out of
the market.
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Proposition 1 Under the profit tax the equilibrium price is higher than in
the benchmark case and the level of welfare lower.
Since U market profit is subject to taxation, for the firm that operates in
both markets it becomes more profitable at the margin to decrease supply in
the U market. In other words, a profit tax makes more attractive for the firm
to sacrifice its U market profit in order to decrease its loss in the R market
and thus tends to further increase the price.
As the regulator wishes to get the maximum welfare possible, it is clear
that it will not choose to implement an endogenous tax that lowers the wel-
fare. Notice that when the size of the rural market is very big, that is b→∞,
under a profit tax the winner firm is going to ask for a subsidy equal to the
direct subsidy.
It is also worth mentioning that if the government imposes a tax just on
the urban market profits instead of a tax on the overall profits, this is going
to be a particular case of the tax on global profits and it will lead to the
same welfare effect as the tax on the overall profits, that means it leads to a
decrease in welfare.8
We should emphasize here the importance of these conclusions. The in-
crease in price leads to a lower welfare and on the basis of this result we
should bring a strong criticism to the Comision del Mercado de Telecomuni-
caciones (CMT) in Spain. In Spain a fund was defined but it’s not operative
yet. The contributions to the fund are function of the revenues. The tax on
revenue belongs to the same family of concave taxable basis as the tax on
profits, as it depends directly on the market price. The CMT settles a tax
on the revenue of the operators and this determines a smaller social welfare,
so in general this regime is not desirable.
8With a tax on profit on the urban market, the objective functions of the maximization
problems become
max
q1
pi1 − FU − FR + q2
q1 + q2
S
and
max
q2
pi2 − FU − q2
q1 + q2
S
therefore this is just a restriction of the previous case of tax on overall profits (is equiv-
alent with taking b = 0 in the objective functions of the maximization problems.
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6.2 Quantity tax in the U market
Suppose that the regulator introduces a quantity tax t in the U market. In
some countries (Germany, Austria) the contributions to the fund are func-
tions of the market share of the operators, so it makes sense to consider an
example of a quantity tax. This is a way of creating a cross-subsidy from the
profitable market to the unprofitable market.
Each firm maximizes its profits subject to the restriction that the subsidy
must be equal to the sum of the taxes levied from both operators.
S = t (q1 + q2)
The maximization problems of the two firms are equivalent to
max
q1
pi1 − FU − FR + q2
q1 + q2
S
and
max
q2
pi2 − FU − q2
q1 + q2
S
By simple comparison with the profit tax objective functions after sub-
stituting the constraints it can be seen that this is just a similar case of the
situation described there.9 Under a tax on profit, if b = 0, the profit tax
maximization problems after substituting the constraints become the prob-
lems of the two firms under a quantity tax in the U market. Therefore, under
a quantity tax in the U market we will obtain the same effects on equilibrium
price and social welfare as under the profit tax. The only difference is that
these effects are scaled by a factor b. Now the welfare lowers even more, as
under a profit tax the factor b just mitigates the decrease in welfare. The
two cases follow the same dynamic (see the optimization problems).
Notice that the market price increases as a consequence of both operators
incentives to lower their market share, to influence their own taxable basis
producing less, in order to pay a smaller tax. In terms of welfare, this is the
worst endogenous tax of all the taxes described so far.
9We can replicate the results from the profit tax case taxing the quantities that firms
sell in the U and R markets.
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6.3 Tax on the total quantity in the U market
Another type of tax the regulator could impose is a tax on the total quantity
in the U market. Each firm maximizes its profits subject to the restriction
that the subsidy must be equal to the sum of the taxes levied from both
operators.
The maximization problem of the firm 1, the winner of the auction, is:
max
q1
pi1 − FU − FR + S − t(q1 + q2)
s.t. S = 2t (q1 + q2)
Under the same restriction firm 2, the loser of the auction solves:
max
q2
pi2 − FU − t (q1 + q2)
s.t. S = 2t (q1 + q2)
Proposition 2 Under a tax on the total quantity in the U market, the equi-
librium price, the operating profit of the two firms, the welfare and the subsidy
required by the winner firm for provision of USOs are equal to the ones ob-
tained in the benchmark case.
Notice that with a tax on the total quantity in the U market we obtained
the same welfare as in the benchmark case. Notice also that, in the framework
of directives of the European Parliament, the tax on the total quantity in the
U market presents the advantage of being a competitively neutral tax, which
minimizes the distortions. The intuition behind the competitively neutral
character of this tax is that, given the subsidy S, the two firms will try to
lower their taxable basis in order to pay less. The subsidy S is fixed and, by
difference with the previous case analyzed, both firms have to share equally
its cost, paying the same. Therefore, the firms can not avoid to pay a fixed
quantity for the subsidy.
Nevertheless, the regulator pursues the goal of the highest aggregate social
welfare, calculated as the sum of consumer’s net surplus and firms net profits.
When he gives the same weight to the consumers and to the producers, it
is not advantageous for him to implement a tax on the total quantity in the
U market, as it leads to the same welfare as in the exogenous case. Besides,
the loser of the auction could be pushed out of the market due to large tax.
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6.4 Implications of the current regulatory regime -
non-intervention regime
The goal of welfare maximization implies that the government should choose
some tax that minimizes the resulting distortions. As we have seen above,
all the taxes considered lead to a level of welfare which is at most equal to
the welfare under the direct subsidy (the benchmark case). With a tax on
the total quantity in the U market we obtain a welfare equal to the welfare
of the benchmark case, and with the other two taxes we obtain lower levels
of welfare. Therefore, under this regulatory regime, when the tax rate, t, is
determined at the end of the game and the intervention of the regulator is
minimized, the objective of the endogenous financing, which is to internalize
negative externalities at social level and obtain better welfare is not attained.
The best we could get in terms of welfare is at most the same level as under
exogenous financing, and besides, in this case there is the possibility that the
loser firm will be pushed out of the market, because the subsidy is paid now
by the firms.
7 Regulated regime
As an alternative to the current regulatory regime we will propose now an-
other one and we will show that the latter one is preferable when the regulator
follows the objective of the highest social welfare. We will show, using the
same taxes we used above, that under the new regulation pattern it is pos-
sible to obtain a higher welfare than with exogenous financing. Under this
new regulatory regime, the tax rate is determined simultaneously with the
equilibrium quantities by the regulator. The game is similar to the one that
we have with the first regulatory pattern, being the way the tax rate, t, is
determined the only difference.
The timing of the model now is the following: first the regulator an-
nounces the type of endogenous financing, the taxable basis. Then the firms
compete a´ la Cournot and the tax rate, t, is determined by the regulator si-
multaneously with the resolution of the firms’ optimization problems, in the
same stage of the game. As before, we solve the game by backward induction,
focusing on pure strategy equilibria.
With the ‘non-intervention regime’ the firms have more freedom, one firm
can use its own taxable basis to influence the market price, whereas under
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the ‘regulated regime’ this can not be done. The only way in which a firm can
manipulate the market price in the direction that is convenient to it is through
the taxable basis of the rival. In this new regimen we find situations where
the consumers are better off, and the improvement in consumers’ surplus
overweighs the decrease in the firms’ profits such that the total social welfare
is higher.
To exemplify the intuition described above we will consider the three
taxes analyzed with the first regulatory regime. Moreover, we will provide
with a generalization.
7.1 Competitively neutral tax: Quantity tax in the U
market
Suppose that the regulator introduces a quantity tax in the U market. The
complete information game is similar to the game played in a framework
without taxes, the difference is that now, given S, in the last stage of the game
Cournot competition takes place under restrictions. Each firm maximizes its
profits subject to the restriction that the subsidy must be equal to the sum
of the taxes levied from both operators.
When the subsidy is financed through a tax on the firms that are present
in the market, a cross-subsidy from the profitable to the unprofitable zone is
created.
Subject to a common restriction, firm 1, the winner, solves the following
problem:
max
q1
pi1 − FU − FR + S − tq1
s.t. S = t (q1 + q2)
Similarly, firm 2, the loser of the auction solves:
max
q2
pi2 − FU − tq2
s.t. S = t (q1 + q2)
Proposition 3 Under a quantity tax in the U market we obtain the same
market price and the same level of welfare as under the exogenous subsidy.
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Moreover, in equilibrium the opportunity cost of gaining the auction is
zero, so:
pi1 − FR + S − tq1 = pi2 − tq2
and we can derive the following result.
Proposition 4 Under endogenous financing of the universal service through
a quantity tax in the urban market, the operator in charge of providing the
USOs receives a subsidy lower than the subsidy he would receive under ex-
ogenous financing.
In the context of the directives of the European Parliament the advan-
tage of a quantity tax versus an exogenous financing is undeniable. Using a
quantity tax we obtain the same market price and the same level of welfare
as with the exogenous subsidy. The quantity tax is therefore a competitively
neutral tax. If the regulator’s objective is to obtain the best welfare level, he
should choose a tax that minimizes the distortions. Moreover, the subsidy
the winner firms gets is lower than under the benchmark case. Besides, if we
suppose that in the exogenous case the subsidy is paid by consumers, and
that the authorities want to ‘minimize the impact of the financial burden
falling on end-users’, then the regulator will strictly prefer an endogenous
subsidy levied through a quantity tax. Producers’ surplus is lower than un-
der the benchmark case, as now firms internalize the cost of the subsidy.
Consumers’ surplus is higher, as the subsidy is now paid by the firms and
not by the consumers.
Nevertheless, there are cases in which very high fixed costs could make
endogenous financing of USOs not applicable, as the loser firm would be
pushed out of the market. When fixed costs are extremely high, the subsidy
is also high and the firm that loses the auction cannot pay its part of tax
without getting out of the market.10 In such a case only exogenous financing
makes sense.
7.2 Profit tax in the U market
Another type of tax the regulator could impose is a tax on profit of the firms
in the urban market. The profit of the winner firm can be written as
10For further details, see proof of proposition 4.
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pi1 = pi
U
1 + pi
R
1
where piU1 is the profit in the urban area and pi
R
1 is the profit in the rural
area.
Firm 1’s maximization problem is
max
q1
pi1 − FU − FR + S − tpiU1
s.t. S = t
(
piU1 + pi2
)
Similarly, firm 2, the loser of the auction solves:
max
q2
pi2 − FU − tpi2
s.t. S = t
(
piU1 + pi2
)
Proposition 5 Under the profit tax the equilibrium price is higher than in
the benchmark case and the level of welfare lower.
The intuition behind this result is that both firms want to increase their
quantities because in this way they pay less in taxes as their competitor’s
profits are higher. A direct consequence of this result is that the level of
welfare is lower than under the benchmark case, and lower than in the pre-
vious case of endogenous financing (financing through a quantity tax in U
market). Another consequence of a higher price than under the benchmark
case is that, although still possible, now it will be more difficult to push out
of the market the firm that looses the bid.
The endogenous subsidy is then
Send =
piU1 (t) + pi2(t)
2pi2(t)
(
pi2(t)− pi1(t) + FR
)
and it is smaller than the exogenous subsidy.11
11See Gonzalez Gomez P., (2003)
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Under a profit tax in the urban market, the rural market becomes more
attractive to the operators and they have more incentives to convert into the
monopolist in the rural market. Competition becomes therefore more ag-
gressive and the equilibrium subsidy decreases with respect to the exogenous
one. Both firms make more operating profits than in the exogenous case,
because now they internalize the cost of the subsidy and so they choose to
provide a smaller quantity. consumers’ surplus lowers more than the increase
in the firms’ operating profits, hence total welfare decreases.
As the subsidy is an increasing function of t, as bigger is the subsidy
required, as bigger is the tax rate levied by the government. The opportunity
cost of gaining the auction is decreasing in t, this means that as bigger is the
tax, as smaller is the opportunity cost of gaining the bid. Both firms have
more incentive to be the winner as tax rate, t, increases, so they compete
more aggressively and therefore, the subsidies are lower now than in the
benchmark case.
7.3 Tax on the total quantity in the U market
Suppose now that the regulator imposes a tax on the total quantity produced
in the urban market. The operators will maximize their respective objective
functions subject to this common restriction. Firm 1, the winner, solves the
maximization problem:
max
q1
pi1 − FU − FR + S − t (q1 + q2)
s.t. S = 2t (q1 + q2)
Similarly, firm 2, the loser of the bid solves:
max
q2
pi2 − FU − t (q1 + q2)
s.t. S = 2t (q1 + q2)
Proposition 6 Under a tax on the total quantity on the U market the equi-
librium price is lower than in the benchmark case and the level of welfare
higher.
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The intuition behind this result is that the tax on the total quantity on the
U market is an equalitarian tax and the operators internalize the negative
externality of the competitor. When a firm decides to produce more, the
competitor has to pay more in taxes because taxable basis of both firms
is the total quantity. Compared with the other cases we get the highest
consumer’ surplus and the lowest firms’ profits.
The endogenous subsidy is in this case
Send = pi2(t)− pi1(t) + FR
Proposition 7 The equilibrium subsidy when a tax on the total quantity in
the urban market is imposed is higher than the exogenous subsidy.
Notice that we obtained that under a tax on the total quantity on the
U market, an equalitarian tax to cover the subsidy, the level of welfare is
higher than under the direct subsidy and higher than under all the endoge-
nous subsidies considered so far. This finding is against the regulatory regime
at work that requires the proportionality principle to be satisfied. The Di-
rective 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council enacts
the principle of proportionality.
Due to the lower price than under exogenous subsidy, the firm that loses
the bid and operates only in the urban market can be pushed out of the
market easier than under the competitively neutral tax.
7.4 Welfare analysis
One of the justifications of universal service obligations relies on the fact
that it increments social welfare. Given the constraint of the USOs, we are
searching for the financing mechanism that guarantees the maximum level of
welfare and it is important to analyze the results from this point of view.
For the figures we assume for simplicity the fixed costs of the urban market
FU = 0, as well as c = 0 and a = 100.
Recall that we computed the aggregate social welfare as the sum of con-
sumers’ net surplus and firms net profit, giving the same weight to the con-
sumers and to the producers. Figure 1 shows the social welfare versus the
size of the rural market. Keeping the fixed costs of the rural market, FR con-
stant when the size of the rural market b increases, the welfare under the tax
on the total quantity in the urban market is higher than the welfare under
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any of the other taxes, even higher than the welfare in the benchmark case.
It can be seen that the social welfare is, in any case, an increasing function
of the size of the rural market size, b. Nevertheless, as higher is the social
welfare, as higher the market price and therefore, as lower is the probability
of pushing out of the market the loser firm.
Figure 2 shows the graph of the social welfare versus the R market fixed
costs, holding constant the size of the rural market, b. Under the competi-
tively neutral tax (the tax on quantity on the urban market) we get exactly
the same welfare as with the direct subsidy (the two paths overlap). The
only difference is that now producer’ surplus is smaller, as the operators pay
the subsidy through the tax and consumer’s surplus is higher.
Considering the importance of a competitively neutral tax in the context
of the European legislation, we take as a second benchmark the case of the
competitively neutral tax (the tax on quantity on the urban market). Under
the total quantity tax we obtain a higher welfare (see Figures 1 and 2) and
under the profit tax a lower one. With respect to the competitively neu-
tral tax, the imposition of a total quantity tax determines a lower producer’
surplus, as the producers internalize the cost of the subsidy, and a higher con-
sumers’ surplus. The profit tax determines a higher producers’ surplus, that
overweighs the decrease in the consumers’ surplus, such that total welfare
decreases.
In the Figures it can be seen that, of all the cases analyzed, the one that
leads to the highest social welfare is the case of a total quantity tax in the
urban market. This is also the framework for the highest consumer’ surplus
and the lowest producer’ surplus. The second highest welfare is obtained
under the competitively neutral tax.
Figures 3 and 4 show the subsidy as function of the fixed cost an of the
size of the rural market, b, respectively. From these graphs we can observe
the following regularities. When we hold constant the fixed costs in the rural
market, under all taxes analyzed the subsidy required by the winner firm is
a decreasing function of the rural market size, b. Notice also that when we
hold constant the rural market size b, the subsidy increases with the fixed
costs of the rural market. The lowest subsidy is attained with a profit tax
and the highest one with the tax on the total quantity in the rural area. This
latter one is also the only subsidy that exceeds the direct subsidy.
In figure 5 it can be seen that when the rural market size increases and
the fixed costs are hold constant, the profit of the loser firm increases also.
Notice that as much as the regulator wants to benefit the consumers, as
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sooner it will determine the firm that losses the bid to get out of the market.
Under the tax on total quantity in the U market, the loser firm makes the
lowest profit, so in this case it will be the easiest to push it out of the market.
In Figure 6 we can observe that, when the rural market size is constant,
the profit of the loser firm under a direct subsidy is flat, as the profit does
not depend on the rural market fixed costs. In all the endogenous cases the
profit of the loser firm decreases with the rural market fixed costs, and is
smaller than with the direct subsidy.
Recall that the European legislation stipulates that the proportionality
principle should be fulfilled. Following this principle, in France for example,
the contributions to the fund are proportional to operators’ traffic, and in
Spain they are a proportional to the revenue. Nevertheless, among the three
cases that we analyzed here, the highest welfare is given by a tax that does
not respect the proportionality principle, the tax on total quantity in the U
market.
If the regulator gives equal weight to the consumers and to the firms, no
matter what the geographical location of the consumer is, then the regulator
should choose the total tax on quantity on the urban market, as it leads to
the biggest social welfare. Nevertheless, with this tax is more likely that the
loser firm gets out of the market and the subsidy the winner firm will require
for provision of USOs is the highest.
Recall the importance of a competitively neutral tax in the context of the
directives of the European Parliament. The European legislation stipulates
that the market distortions should be minimum, as well as the financial
burden falling on end-users. With a competitively neutral tax, a tax on
quantity in the U market, these objectives are fulfilled. Moreover, as it can
be seen in the Figures, the subsidy the winner firms receives is lower than
the direct subsidy or than the subsidy with a tax on total quantity. The
competitively neutral tax does not maximize the welfare (like the tax on the
total quantity does), but it is less likely that the loser firm is going to be
pushed out of the market.
8 Conclusions
This paper contributes to the debate on the financing of the universal service
in the context of deregulation of telecommunications and price restriction
across markets. The subsidy required by the firm in charge of provision of
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the universal service is determined endogenously through a tax to be paid by
the operators. The tax must produce sufficient revenue to cover the subsidy,
that is revenue should equal the winning bid in the unprofitable market
auction.
We analyze two possible choices of the regulation pattern. Each possi-
bility induces a particular game between the operators. These two scenarios
differ in the moment of the election of the tax rate. In one case, this happens
at the end of the game while in the other case the tax rate is determined
simultaneously with the equilibrium quantities. Under both regimes the tax
rate, t, is set such that to cover the cost of USOs, the subsidy S. In the ‘non-
intervention regime’ the government only chooses the taxable basis while un-
der the ‘regulated regime’ it chooses taxable basis as well as the tax rate. In
first regulatory regime the tax the firms should pay is determined endoge-
nously at the end of the game, once the optimum quantities of the firms are
settled. In this case, the firms can use it in their favor as a tool for increasing
their profit to consumers’ detriment. The decrease in the consumers’ surplus
overweighs the increase in the producers’ surplus and the total welfare is
lower than with a direct subsidy. The second regulatory regime, when the
tax rate is determined at the same time as the equilibrium quantities of the
two firms, is more restrictive to the firms. In this situation, for certain types
of taxes, the consumers are better off and the social welfare is higher than
in the benchmark case. The regulator maximizes aggregate social welfare,
that is the sum of consumer’s net surplus and firms net profits. Even if the
intervention of the regulator is minimized with the first regulatory regime,
the second regulatory regime is preferred because for certain taxes leads to
a higher level of social welfare.
Given the importance of a competitively neutral tax in the framework
of the directives of the European Parliament, we show that under the first
regulatory regime a competitively neutral tax (the tax on total quantity in
the urban market) is the best from the point of view of the social welfare.
For the other two types of taxes analyzed lower levels of social welfare are
obtained. The second regulatory regime is superior to the first one in terms
of welfare, as among the same taxes as before determined a lower social
welfare, now we can find taxes that keep the same welfare (the competitively
neutral tax) or increase it (the tax on total quantity). Therefore the best
regulatory regime is the one that determines the tax simultaneously with
the equilibrium quantities, and under this regime the best tax is the tax
on the total quantity. We also give a generalization of this regime and we
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determine under what conditions the welfare can be improved with respect
to the benchmark case.
Notice that the tax on the total quantity is an equalitarian tax over the
subsidy, therefore it does not fulfil the proportionality principle that the
directives of the European Parliament recommend. Nevertheless, when the
consumers and the firms have equal weight in the social welfare, the tax on
the total quantity leads to the highest welfare. The analysis presented here
suggests that, when the consumers and the firms are equal weighted in the
social welfare function the proportionality principle is not desirable.
It is also worth mentioning that, according to the regulatory regime at
work, the identity of the competitively neutral tax changes. Under the first
regime the competitively neutral tax is the tax on the total quantity and un-
der the second one the competitively neutral tax is the tax on the individual
quantity. Both type of taxes lead to the same equilibrium price, and hence,
to the same welfare as with the direct subsidy. We also give a generalization
of the second regime and we determine under what conditions the welfare
can be improved with respect to the benchmark case.
The main policy implications of our paper are that the regulation regime
at work should be the one where the tax rate is chosen by the regulator and
that the proportionality principle is not desirable, as it leads to lower welfare.
Of course, imposing USOs also generates welfare benefits, the representa-
tion of which deserves further analysis. Endogenous financing of the universal
service when an entrant firm is allowed to bid for the rural market is also
left for further research. The presence of outside firms in the rural market
auction will affect bidding and the resulting market structure.
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A Appendix
Given the importance of the regulatory regime we propose as an increasing
welfare regime and the importance of a competitively neutral tax in the
context of the directives of the European Parliament, we will provide with a
generalization of the new regulatory pattern proposed, the ‘regulated regime’.
The generalization we provide below allows us to see the behavior of the
economic agents under different types of taxable basis (it comprises the case
of tax on quantity, tax on profits, tax on revenue or any other type of tax).
A.1 Generic tax in the U market
We have seen that taxes may be assessed through different channels and we
considered for our analysis three types of taxes in the U market: a unitary
tax on the quantity produced (∂p
∂t
= 0), a taxes levied on profits (∂p
∂t
> 0) and
an equalitarian tax, a tax on the total quantity (∂p
∂t
< 0). We could generalize
the previous analysis of the different types of endogenous subsidies.
Let t be the tax rate the government imposes and let Bi be the taxable
basis of firm i (where i = 1, 2), the variable that we levy the tax on (it could
be quantity, price, profit, revenue or any other variable).12
Firm 1, the winner solves the following problem:
max
q1
pi1 − FU − FR + S − tB1
s.t. S = t (B1 +B2)
Firm 2, the loser of the auction, solves:
max
q2
pi2 − FU − tB2
s.t. S = t (B1 +B2)
The first order conditions for these two problems are:
12Recall that the taxable basis Bi is imposed by the regulator at the beginning of the
game.
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∂pi1
∂q1
+ t
∂B2
∂q1
= 0
∂pi2
∂q2
+ t
∂B1
∂q2
= 0
On the other hand, in equilibrium the opportunity cost of gaining the
auction should be zero for any firm. So
pi1(t)− FU − FR + S − tB1(t) = pi2(t)− FU − tB2(t)
We also should take into account that the contributions of the operators
should sum up the total value of the subsidy, that is:
S = t (B1 +B2)
Substituting the latter equation in the opportunity cost equation, we get
t =
FR + [pi2(t)− pi1(t)]
2B2(t)
which can be rewritten as
t =
pi2(t)− [pi1(t)− FR]
BT (t) + [B2(t)−B1(t)]
where BT is the total taxable base and pi
∗
2(t), pi
∗
1(t) are the equilibrium
profits. The numerator is the opportunity cost without taxes. The term
B2(t)−B1(t) indicates that the firms internalize the fact that now the firms
pay themselves the provision of the universal service in the rural market.
Substituting the tax obtained above in the opportunity cost equation, we
get the endogenous subsidy
Send =
B1(t) +B2(t)
2B2(t)
[
FR + (pi2(t)− pi1(t))
]
Recall that B1(t) and B2(t) have the same functional form, as they rep-
resent the taxable basis for each of the two firms.
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Notice the fundamental difference between the two regulatory regimes
analyzed. With the ‘non-intervention regime’ the firms have more freedom,
one firm can use its own taxable basis to influence the market price, whereas
under the ‘regulated regime’ this can not be done. The only way in which a
firm can manipulate the market price in the direction that is convenient to
it is through the taxable basis of the rival. The derivative ∂Bi
∂qj
is therefore
essential as it shows if one firm can or cannot influence the market price using
the taxable basis of the rival.
The three cases studied above can be summarized as follows.
1. ∂Bi
∂qj
= 0, i = 1, 2, i 6= j. This is the case of a competitively neutral tax,
as it could be a tax on quantity.
2. ∂Bi
∂qj
< 0, i = 1, 2, i 6= j. This condition is satisfied by a tax on profit of
the operators. As the objective of the regulator is to maximize social
welfare, we will not consider this case for generalization as under this
condition the social welfare decreases with respect to the exogenous
subsidy.
3. ∂Bi
∂qj
> 0, i = 1, 2, i 6= j. This is the case of a tax on the total quantity.
A.2 Competitively neutral tax: ∂Bi∂qj = 0, i = 1, 2, i 6= j
The idea of a competitively neutral endogenous tax is that the presence of
USOs is designed not to affect competition and the profit of the firms with
respect to the benchmark case. We have already emphasized the impor-
tance of a competitively neutral tax in the context of the Directives of the
European Parliament and of the Council. As it can be seen, regulatory au-
thorities follow the objective of a ‘minimum distortion to the market and to
undertakings ’. Taking into account this objective we derive the next results.
Proposition 8 The tax the operators pay is a competitively neutral tax for
the market if and only if ∂Bi
∂qj
= 0, i = 1, 2, i 6= j.
Corollary 9 The tax the operators pay is a competitively neutral tax as long
as the taxable basis does not depend on the price, either on any function of the
price. In general the taxable basis should not depend on any of the decision
variables of the other firm.
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Proposition 10 Under endogenous financing of the universal service through
a competitively neutral tax, if the taxable basis has an increasing functional
form, the operator in charge of providing the USOs receives a subsidy lower
than or equal to the subsidy he would receive under exogenous financing.
A direct consequence of latter result we get the following propositions.13
Proposition 11 When ∂Bi
∂qj
= 0, i = 1, 2, i 6= j, the subsidy required by the
winner firm is minimized when the winner does not contribute with anything
to the fund.
Proposition 12 When ∂Bi
∂qj
= 0, i = 1, 2, i 6= j, and the winner firm does
not contribute with anything to the fund, the endogenous subsidy reaches its
minimum which is half of the direct subsidy.
Notice also that the endogenous financing we considered leads to the
same level of welfare as the direct subsidy and leaves unchanged the decision
variables of the two firms and also the market price. The advantage of
the endogenous financing is that the subsidy required for providing USOs
is smaller than in the exogenous case. Moreover, if we suppose that in the
direct case the subsidy is paid by consumers, and that the authorities want
to ‘minimises the impact of the financial burden falling on end-users’, then
the regulator will strictly prefer an endogenous indirect subsidy.
Nevertheless, there are cases in which very high fixed costs could make
endogenous financing of USOs not applicable, as the loser firm would be
pushed out of the market. When fixed costs are extremely high only exoge-
nous financing (direct subsidy) makes sense.
13‘When the firm operates in both markets, the incentive to relax the cross-market restric-
tion makes the firm a ‘softer’ competitor and places the firm at a strategic disadvantage
relative to the urban market competitors.
A firm that supplies both markets would like to set a rural price in excess of the oligopolis-
tically determined urban price and, as a result, the reaction function of this firm shifts in
the direction that makes this firm a ´softer’ competitor. The shift (...) is downwards under
quantity setting.’- Anton, Vander Wide and Vettas (2002)
33
A.3 Increasing welfare tax: ∂Bi∂qj > 0, i = 1, 2, i 6= j
We will analyze now the case when ∂Bi
∂qj
> 0, i = 1, 2, i 6= j, which is the third
case of the above generalization. Such a condition is satisfied for example by
the tax on the total quantity in the U market. We have shown that under
a tax on total quantity we obtain the highest welfare among all the cases
studied, as the market price decreases with respect to the other tax regimes.
We will show now that this result can be generalized for any type of tax basis
that satisfies the conditions mentioned below.
Proposition 13 When ∂Bi
∂qj
> 0, i = 1, 2, i 6= j, and the taxable basis is a
concave function with positive cross second derivatives, than the social welfare
is higher than under the competitively neutral tax (∂Bi
∂qj
= 0, i = 1, 2, i 6= j),
and therefore higher than when ∂Bi
∂qj
< 0, i = 1, 2, i 6= j.
Hence, among all endogenous tax regimes this is the one that maximizes
the social welfare.
For a convex functional form of the taxable basis, we will consider two
functional forms and we will show that for a large class of functions, we ob-
tain, as in the above case, an increase in welfare with respect to the bench-
mark cases.
1. Suppose now that the functional form of the taxable basis is B(q1, q2) =
(q1 + q2)
α, where α ≥ 2 is any integer number. Applying the same
procedure as in the proof of proposition 13, we can show that
dq1 + dq2
dt
=
2α (q1 + q2)
α−1
3 + 2b− 2tα (α− 1) (q1 + q2)α−2
As 3 + 2b > 2tα (α− 1) (q1 + q2)α−2 is a necessary condition for the
firms maximization problems to be well defined, we obtain that also in
this case inequality dq1+dq2
dt
> 0 is satisfied, therefore the social welfare
is superior to the welfare in the benchmark cases.
2. Let the functional form of the taxable basis be B(q1, q2) = q
α
1 + q
α
2 .
Solving the firms maximization problems, we obtain
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q1 + q2 =
(2 + b) (a− c) + αt
(
qα−11 + q
α−1
2
)
3 + 2b
Differentiating with respect to t we get
dq1 + dq2
dt
>
α
(
qα−11 + q
α−1
2
)
3 + 2b− αt(α− 1)qα−21
> 0
The last inequality is a condition for the firms maximization problems
to be well defined. Hence we obtain an increase in welfare.
We showed that under certain conditions, when the taxable basis satisfies
∂Bi
∂qj
> 0, i = 1, 2, i 6= j, we obtain always a bigger welfare than under
competitively neutral tax (∂Bi
∂qj
= 0, i = 1, 2, i 6= j). Nevertheless, among
all the taxes that fulfil this condition (∂Bi
∂qj
> 0, i = 1, 2, i 6= j) there is no
taxable basis strictly better than others in terms of welfare, for any value of
the rural market size, b and for any value of the rural market fixed cost FR.
To exemplify this, in Figure 7 we will compare a quadratic taxable basis
(QT), Bi = (q1 + q2)
2 with a linear tax (LT) , Bi = q1 + q2. Figure 7 shows
that, for very big rural market size and small fixed costs, the universal service
could be provided by a monopolist that would operate only in the R market,
so in region E of the graph USOs would nod be needed. In region A of the
graph both type of taxes lead to negative profit of the loser firm, so we will
not consider this area. In region B the quadratic tax lead also to negative
profit for the loser firm, so here only a linear tax could be operative.
Hence the regions where both types of taxes are operative are C and D.
Notice that the quadratic taxable basis determines higher welfare than the
linear one in region C of the graph, therefore, the quadratic taxable basis is
preferable in a framework where the fixed costs in the rural market are high
and the size of the rural market is low . The linear taxable basis is preferable
in situations where the rural market fixed costs FR are low and the size of
the unprofitable market, b is very big (region D in the graph).
The aggregate quantity under the linear tax is
q1 + q2 =
(2 + b) (a− c) + 2t
3 + 2b
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and under the quadratic tax is
q1 + q2 =
(2 + b) (a− c)
3 + 2b− 2t
Both aggregate quantities are increasing in the tax rate, t. As bigger
the tax rate t is, as bigger the aggregate quantity and so as smaller the
equilibrium price. Since to high fixed costs FR correspond high tax rates t
(Send =
B1(t)+B2(t)
2B2(t)
[FR + (pi2(t)− pi1(t))]), under a linear tax, when b is small
the aggregate quantity is also small, so the price is high and in this case the
quadratic tax is preferable, as it leads to higher welfare. When FR is small
the tax rate t is low, and with b high, the aggregate quantity with a linear
tax is big, so this taxation regime is better as it leads to higher welfare.
As it can be seen in Figure 7, there is no taxation regime strictly better
than the other one for any value of b and FR . For certain values of these
parameters, we can determine whether the quadratic tax is better or the
linear one, but in general this is difficult to be said.
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A.4 Proof Proposition 1
As S ≤ (1+b)(2+b)2(a−c)2
4(3+2b)
is a necessary condition for the loser firm not to be
out of the market, we obtain positive equilibrium quantities. It can be easily
verified that ∂qi
∂S
< 0, i = 1, 2, so q1 and q2 are decreasing functions of the
subsidy S. When S = 0 we are back in the benchmark case. Hence, for any
subsidy S > 0 we will obtain bigger quantities q1 and q2. The equilibrium
price is
p = a− q1 − q2
so the price is higher than with the exogenous subsidy and then the social
welfare decreases with respect to the benchmark case.
A.5 Proof Proposition 2
The maximization problems of the two operators lead to
max
q1
pi1 − FU − FR + S
2
and
max
q2
pi2 − FU − S
2
As FU , FR and S
2
are constants, it is straightforward that the solution of
these maximization problems is the same as in the benchmark case. Therefore
we obtain the same equilibrium price and the same level of welfare. Moreover,
in equilibrium the opportunity cost of gaining the auction is zero, so:
pi1 − FR + S − t (q1 + q2) = pi2 − t (q1 + q2)
From the above equation and the restriction of the maximization problem,
it can be seen that the subsidy obtained is equal to the direct subsidy.
A.6 Proof Proposition 3
The solution of the maximization problems is:
q1 =
a− c
3 + 2b
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q2 =
(a− c) (1 + b)
3 + 2b
The equilibrium profit of the winner firm is:
pi1 =
(a− c)2 (1 + b)3
(3 + 2b)2
and for the loser firm is
pi2 =
(a− c)2 (1 + b)2
(3 + 2b)2
Market price is
p =
(1 + b) (a+ c) + c
3 + 2b
Notice that ∂p
∂t
= 0, as the price does not depend on the tax t. Therefore
in equilibrium we obtain the same quantities, profits, welfare and price as in
the benchmark case.
A.7 Proof Proposition 4
Substituting the constraint into the objective function we can solve it for t
and get the equilibrium subsidy:
Send =
q1 + q2
2q2
(
pi2 − pi1 + FR
)
The term in the bracket is the subsidy in the exogenous case. As q1+q2
2q2
=
2+b
2(1+b)
< 1, we obtain Send < Sexo.
A.8 Proof Proposition 5
Solving the optimization problems we get the equilibrium price
p =
a(1 + b) + (1− t)c(2 + b)− at(b+ t)
3 + 2b− 2t− 2bt− t2
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which is an increasing function of t, as ∂p
∂t
> 0.14 When t = 0, we get the
market price under the benchmark case, so the equilibrium price is going to
be higher than with exogenous subsidy. To a higher price it corresponds a
lower social welfare.15
A.9 Proof Proposition 6
Solving these problems we derive the equilibrium price
p =
a(1 + b) + c(2 + b)− 2t
3 + 2b
which is a decreasing function of t, as ∂p
∂t
< 0. As t = 0 in the above
equation leads to the price under the benchmark case, for any positive t the
market price is now lower than in the benchmark case. Hence, the social
welfare is higher than with exogenous subsidy, and higher than in any of the
endogenous cases previously analyzed.
A.10 Proof Proposition 7
Solving the maximization problems we get the profits of the two firms in the
equilibrium:
pi1 =
(1 + b) ((a− c) (1 + b)− bt)2
(3 + 2b)2
pi2 =
(a− c+ 2tb) (1 + b) [(a− c) (1 + b)− bt]
(3 + 2b)2
We denote by piend2 (t), pi
end
1 (t) the profit of the firms in the endogenous case
of a tax on total quantity on the U market and by piexo2 , pi
exo
1 the profit of the
firms under exogenous subsidy. Then it can be checked that the inequality
Send = pi
end
2 (t)− piend1 (t) + FR < Sexo = piexo2 − piexo1 + FR
is satisfied for any t < a − c + a−c
2b
, hence for any t < a − c, which a
necessary condition for the firms not to incur in loses.
14See Gonzalez Gomez P., (2003)
15The same conclusions apply to other taxes than the tax on profit, as the tax on total
revenue or the tax on price. This is because these taxes belong to the same family of
taxable basis that involves the market price.
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A.11 Proof Proposition 8
Plugging the conditions in the first order conditions of both firms maximiza-
tion problems we get
∂pii
∂qi
= 0, i = 1, 2
A.12 Proof Proposition 10
We have already found the subsidy under endogenous financing is
Sneuend =
B1(t) +B2(t)
2B2(t)
[
FR + (pi∗2(t)− pi∗1(t))
]
Using Proposition 1 we get that equilibrium profits do not depend on the
tax t, and as the term in the bracket is just the exogenous subsidy, comparing
the two subsidies we obtain that Sneuend ≤ Sexo if and only if
B1(t) +B2(t)
2B2(t)
≤ 1.
Consider f() to be the functional form of the taxable basis, an increasing
function. Then the previous relation can be written
f(q1) + f(q2)
2f(q2)
≤ 1
As q2 > q1, then the above inequality is clearly fulfilled by any increasing
function f(). Therefore, Sneuend ≤ Sexo
A.13 Proof Proposition 11
The lowest endogenous subsidy would be attained when the ratio f(q1)+f(q2)
2f(q2)
is minimized, so we have to solve the problem
min
f(q1),f(q2)
f(q1) + f(q2)
2f(q2)
s.t. q1 < q2
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f(q1) ≥ 0
f(q2) ≥ 0
This is equivalent to
min
f(q1),f(q2)
f(q1)
f(q2)
s.t. q1 < q2f(q1) ≥ 0f(q2) ≥ 0
As we supposed the function f is increasing, we get that the objective
function in the minimization problem belongs to the interval [0,1]. Therefore
the solution to this problem is any increasing function that makes f(q1) = 0,
f(x) > 0 for any x 6= q1. This means that the subsidy required by the firm
that wins the auction is minimized when the firm does not contribute with
anything to the fund.16
A.14 Proof Proposition 12
The previous proposition shows that when the subsidy is paid entirely by
the loser operator, the endogenous subsidy is minimized. The opportunity
cost equation becomes
pi1(t)− FR + S = pi2(t)− tB2(t)
16Notice that this case, when the winner of the bid does not pay anything to the subsidy,
is similar to one analyzed by P.Chone, L. Flochel and A. Perrot (2002). Although they use
another framework, they consider a ‘taxation regime’ under which the incumbent which
is the winner of the bid, serves high cost consumers, and the entrant serves the low cost
consumers and pays a tax t for the subsidy. As in our model, depending on the tax level
t, the firm that loses the auction could be pushed out of the market. Nevertheless, our
model differs from the one studied by P.Chone, L. Flochel and A. Perrot (2002) as they
suppose the regulator have perfect information. In general, in the market for a network
product there is asymmetric information between the regulator and the operators. The
advantage of our model is that it uses auctions to allocate the USOs and determine which
firm will serve the market, reducing in this way the informational rents, distortions created
by asymmetric information between the regulator and the operators.
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and
S = tB2(t)
It can be easily checked that Sneuend =
Sexo
2
.
A.15 Proof Proposition 13
Notice that if the functional form of the taxable basis is of the type g(p)h(q1, q2),
where g and h are increasing functions, then the taxable basis does not fulfil
the condition ∂Bi
∂qj
> 0, i = 1, 2, i 6= j . An example of such a tax it could be
a tax on the profit of the operators or a tax on revenue.
Swartz’s theorem (or Young’s theorem) states that if at least one of the
two partial derivatives of a function f(q2, q1) is continuous, then
∂2f
∂q2∂q1
=
∂2f
∂q1∂q2
.
Totally differentiating the first order conditions of both firms maximiza-
tion problems we get the following system of equations(
∂2pi1
∂q21
+ t
∂2B2
∂q21
)
dq1 +
(
∂2pi1
∂q1∂q2
+ t
∂2B2
∂q1∂q2
)
dq2 +
∂B2
∂q1
dt = 0
(
∂2pi2
∂q22
+ t
∂2B1
∂q22
)
dq2 +
(
∂2pi2
∂q2∂q1
+ t
∂2B1
∂q2∂q1
)
dq1 +
∂B1
∂q2
dt = 0
Notice that
pi1 = (a− q1 − q2) (q1 + b (q1 + q2))
pi2 = (a− q1 − q2) q2
In the sequel we use the following notations:
∂B2
∂q1
= B′1,
∂B1
∂q2
= B′2,
∂2B1
∂q22
= B22
∂2B2
∂q1∂q2
= B12,
∂2B1
∂q2∂q1
= B21,
∂2B2
∂q21
= B11
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Solving the above system of equations, we obtain dq1
dt
and dq2
dt
and sum-
ming them up we get
dq1 + dq2
dt
=
B′2 (1 + tB12 − tB11) + B′1 (1 + tB21 − tB22)
A
where
A = 3+2b+tB21 (1 + 2b)+tB12+t
2 (B11B22 −B12B21)−2tB11−2t (1 + b)B22
As the taxable basis is a concave function with positive cross second
derivatives, that is B12 and B21 are both positive, then
dq1 + dq2
dt
> 0
As the price in the U market is determined as p = a− q1 − q2, the latter
inequality implies that
dp
dt
< 0
This shows that the price decreases with t, therefore the social welfare is
higher now than in the benchmark cases. Under the competitively neutral
tax, as well as under the exogenous subsidy the price is flat with respect to
t.
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Figure 1: Social welfare versus rural market size (with FR = 3000).
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Figure 2: Social welfare versus rural market fixed costs (with b = 0.75).
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Figure 3: Subsidy versus rural market size (with FR = 3000).
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Figure 4: Subsidy versus rural market fixed costs (with b = 0.75).
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Figure 5: Profit of the loser firm versus rural market size (with FR = 3000).
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Figure 6: Profit of the loser firm versus rural market fixed cots (with b =
0.75).
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Figure 7: Comparison of a linear tax with a quadratic tax 
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